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I.

Introduction and Background
A recent paper by Dollar and Kraay (2001) finds that growth is good for the poor, but that the income of the poor does not respond systematically to supposedly "pro-poor" policies such as public expenditure on education. Using a sample covering 137 countries over the period , they report that the income of the poor rises one-for-one with average income. However, the primary educational attainment of the workforce (and the level of primary enrollment, as in an earlier version of their paper) does not seem have a measurable effect on the income of the poor beyond its effect on average income. Hence, their work tends to suggest that a focus on education rather than on growth might be misplaced as an essential component of any poverty-reduction strategy.
We test the robustness of the findings by Dollar and Kraay (2001) by using a broader measure of human capital, which considers all levels of education and accounts for international differences in the quality of education. Contrary to Dollar and Kraay, we find that a higher stock of human capital increases the income of the poor, not only through its effect on average income, but also through its effect on the distribution of income. Our results appear to be robust to a number of alternative specifications. We interpret our findings as suggesting that effective education policies would be a first-best poverty reduction strategy.
Our interpretation of the empirical evidence seems to be more in line with a policy strategy favored by the Development Report 2000 (World Bank 2000a) than the paper we seek to criticize, which in fact emanated from the World Bank's research department. With its focus on attacking poverty, the Development Report goes significantly beyond the message conveyed by Dollar and Kraay (2001) in that economic growth is merely considered to be a necessary condition for achieving development and reducing poverty, but it is not deemed a sufficient force. Effective antipoverty strategies are meant to focus on three additional issues: strengthening the participation of poor people in local decision-making and fighting discrimination; reducing vulnerability of the poor to economic and natural shocks, sickness and violence; and lastly, expanding economic opportunity and access to assets, such as education, capital and land. An additional study by the World Bank on growth and poverty (World Bank 2000b) further emphasized the centrality of education in the development process. This study argues that human capital appears to be the main asset of most poor people. Hence, investment in the human capital of the poor should be a powerful way to augment their assets, redress asset inequality and reduce poverty.
Recent analyses of international differences in output per worker and growth rates have also raised the awareness of the role of human capital in development, either as a direct or as an indirect factor.
1 The endogenous growth literature emphasizes the centrality of human capital for innovation and technological progress. Most empirical cross-country studies of long-run growth now include some measure of human capital.
Regardless of the underlying model, it is a fairly robust empirical finding that a country's human capital is almost always identified as an essential ingredient for achieving growth. 2 However, the quantitative impact of human capital on growth has not been precisely estimated up to now.
The centrality of education in poverty-reduction policies stems from the belief that education is a powerful equalizer. However, this belief cannot command strong theoretical support. Ram (1989) reviews several theoretical frameworks linking the level of schooling and its dispersion with income inequality, such as human capital or dual-economy-type models. He finds that these models do not generate any clear theoretical hypotheses about the effect of education on income inequality or absolute poverty.
For instance, traditional human-capital models of earnings provide two opposing insights with regard to the relationship between education and income-distribution. First, holding other things equal these models imply a partial positive relation between the mean level of schooling and earnings inequality, such that if the mean level of schooling rises, wages of educated workers go up relative to wages earned by non-educated workers. But these models also feature a partial positive relation between schooling inequality and earnings inequality in that a more equal distribution of schooling leads to a more equal distribution of earnings. Knight and Sabot (1983) show these effects in a dual-economy version of the human capital model. Educational expansion has again two different effects on the distribution of earnings and thus on overall income inequality as it raises the supply of educated labor. On the one hand, the composition effect (or Kuznets effect) increases the relative size of the group with higher education (and higher earnings) and thus tends to increase inequality. On the other hand, the wage compression effect resulting from the relatively greater supply of educated labor reduces inequality. Which effect dominates is again unclear and will ultimately depend on the country's level of development, the relative size of the different educational groups, the degree of substitutability between workers with different levels of education, and the wider social, political and economic aspects that affect the structure of relative wages for different educational groups and the demand for labor.
To the extent that formal schooling is a significant component of human capital investment, the recent endogenous growth literature might provide a more conclusive theoretical framework regarding the relationship between educational expansion and income distribution. Tamura (1991) explains income convergence in the developed world by an endogenous growth model with human capital spillovers and heterogeneous agents. In his model, human capital convergence results in income convergence.
Human capital convergence can be induced by educational expansion and the promotion of research activity, and arises because for a given stock of existing knowledge, agents with below average human capital have a higher rate of return to human capital investment.
With a more explicit focus on the formal schooling component of human capital investment, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) By contrast, the endogenous growth model suggested by Lucas (1988) does not predict income convergence. In this model, the human capital is supposed to generate internal and external effects, where the latter means that the average level of education also contributes to the productivity of all other factors of production. Assuming that a given percentage increase in human capital requires the same effort independent of the level of human capital already attained, the model generates sustainable growth through the accumulation of human capital. Due to the presumed linearity in the production of human capital, the model is capable of predicting permanent income differences of any size. Incomes would not converge because the incentive to invest in human capital, as measured by the rate of return to education, would be the same across all levels of income and human capital.
Given the various theoretical possibilities, it is probably not surprising that it has proved to be difficult to identify a clear empirical link between education and income inequality up to now. Intertemporal studies are rare in number and, as Ram (1989) notes, also do not appear to point to general conclusions regarding the relationship between education and inequality.
3 Fields (1980) and Psacharopoulos and Woodhall (1985) provide extensive surveys of the empirical literature. Some older crosssection studies tend to confirm the equalizing function of education. Ram Our paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the data and the basic specification for our empirical analysis. Section III presents our empirical results. Section IV summarizes our argument and points out directions for future research.
II. Data and Specification of Variables
Income distribution
As the source for internationally comparable data on the distribution of income, we draw on the data set initially provided by Deininger and Squire (1996) . This data set contains Gini coefficients and cumulative quintile shares for 111 countries over a period of 40 years. In line with Dollar and Kraay (2001), we define the average per capita income of the 3 There may also exist several indirect mechanisms which influence the relation between educational expansion and reduced inequality. In particular, there appears to be some empirical evidence for the favorable impact of female education on reducing inequality. For instance, Ram (1989) notes that the expansion of female schooling may improve the income distribution through increasing female labor force participation as well as through reducing fertility. Another drawback of this measure is that its capacity to register changes in the mass of the desperately poor across time is not very accurate.
Again, if extraordinary growth in Bangladesh were to halve absolute poverty, our measure may not reflect any change at all. These ambiguities should be kept in mind when we use the term incomes of the poor. Our approach focuses on relative poverty rather than on absolute poverty.
The poverty data we use are taken from an updated version of the Deininger and Squire (1996) data set. As a first step, we derive a sample of 102 countries for which "high quality" Gini coefficients are available.
In order to be included in their "high quality" data set, an observation must be drawn from a published household survey, provide comprehensive coverage of the population and be based on a comprehensive measure of income or expenditure. We only use data around 1990 and restrict our sample to one observation per country. For 89 of the 102 countries with high-quality Gini coefficients, there is also information about the share of income accruing to the poorest 20 percent of the population (quintile 1). For these countries, we measure average per capita income of the poor as average per capita income times the share of income accruing to the poorest quintile divided by 0.2, where data for average per capita income are taken from the Penn World Tables   (PWT 1994) .
We estimate the average per capita income of the poor for the remaining 13 countries in our sample under the assumption that the distribution of income is lognormal. 4 If so, we can approximate the missing quintiles for these countries on the basis of Gini coefficients by using , together with all other variables used in the analysis.
With our data set, we find that income of the poor and average income of the total population are highly correlated. Regressing per capita income of the poor on average per capita income yields an adjusted R-squared of 0.86 and a slope coefficient of 1.06 (with a standard error of 0.04). Our result comes pretty close to the result of Dollar and Kraay (2001) for their basic specification in levels, which they estimate for a sample of 269 pooled cross-country and time series observations. Hence using the same initial specification but a much smaller sample which only includes one observation per country, we also find that growth is good for the poor:
higher average income would translate one-for-one into higher income of the poor. 5 The question is whether other variables could have an additional positive impact on the income of the poor. Our focus is on education.
Education
In the empirical growth literature, it has been common practice to use enrollment rates or average years of education as proxies for the change and the level in the stock of human capital. Dollar and Kraay (2001) , for instance, focus on years of primary education (and on primary enrollment rates in an earlier version of their paper) as their measure of differences in education across countries because deviations from complete primary school enrollments are most likely to reflect the low enrollment among the poorest in society. But given that international variation in primary education tends to be small relative to broader measures of education, their finding of insignificant effects of education on incomes of the poor may not be robust when compared with other measures of education which cover a larger degree of international variation.
As discussed in Wößmann (2000) , the standard specification of human capital in macroeconomic production functions is problematic for methodological and empirical reasons. For instance, a large body of microeconometric evidence based on the Mincerian wage equation would suggest a semi-logarithmic and not a log-linear relation between output per worker and average years of education, which, restricted to primary education, is the measure used in the level equations of Dollar and Kraay (2001) . In addition, rates of return to education tend to decline with rising levels of schooling (Psacharopoulos 1994) , and the quality of a year of education may substantially differ across countries. All these aspects should be taken into account when constructing an empirical measure of the stock of human capital.
Hall and Jones (1999) address these problems by specifying the stock of human capital (H) in a way that is consistent with a microeconomic (2000) on the basis of international cognitive achievement tests of students in mathematics and natural sciences to account for international differences in the quality of education. The resulting measure of human capital per working-age person in country i, which we also use in this paper, is given by where r Pri , r Sec and r High are world-average social rates of return to primary, secondary, and higher education (20 percent, 13 .7 percent, and 10.7 percent, respectively); Pri i and Sec i are country-specific measures of the duration of the primary and the secondary level of schooling; S i is average years of educational attainment in country i taken from Barro and Lee (1996) , and Q i is an index of schooling quality in country i, measured on a 0 to 1 scale.
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At first sight, our measure of quality-adjusted human capital per worker may be criticized for being unnecessarily complicated because the effect of quality in education could be already picked up by a correctly measured country-specific rate of return variable. However, many empirical estimates of country specific rates of return as surveyed by Psacharopoulos (1994) appear implausible. Like Hall and Jones (1999) , we therefore use world average rates of return for the three levels of education for each country. But their approach by definition fails to account for any international differences in the quality of schooling.
Hence equation (3) should be read as attempting to make the best of the available empirical evidence: it captures both the quantity and the quality of education at the country level by multiplying country specific years of schooling with world average rates of return and country specific
estimates of schooling quality. The resulting measure of human capital is certainly not perfect, but it may be preferable to previously used measures because it is based on a functional form in line with a large microeconometric literature and because it considers that the quality of education differs across countries.
III. Empirical Results
To estimate the potential impact of quality-adjusted human capital on the incomes of the poor, we estimate an OLS-regression which controls for (1)). The coefficient a 1 is statistically not different from 1, which preserves the finding that growth in average income is translated one-for-one in growth of income of the poorest quintile of the population.
But in contrast to Dollar and Kraay (2001) we find that the income of the poor increases with rising quality-adjusted human capital. This distributional effect comes on top of the growth effect of rising qualityadjusted human capital, which works through higher average income. Our point estimates suggest that a 10 percent increase in the stock of qualityadjusted human capital per worker would increase the average income of the poor by an additional 3.2 percent.
To test the robustness of our basic result, we include further variables in our regression equation (4). In most empirical growth studies, a measure of physical capital accumulation is found to be a robust variable (Levine and Renelt 1992) . We measure physical capital accumulation (INV) as the average share of real investment in GDP in 1960-1990. 7 In our specification, this variable yields a statistically insignificant negative regression coefficient (column (2)). This result most likely reflects that the inclusion of average income as a conditioning variable already accounts for the potential distributional effect of physical capital accumulation on the income of the poor. But conditioning for average income obviously does not fully account for the distributional effects of human capital accumulation, since the estimated regression coefficient remains statistically significant and more or less unchanged in size.
In further specifications, we include poverty-related variables such as the share of mining in GDP (MINING) and the incidence of malaria in a country (MALARIA) as further checks of the robustness of our results. 8 A high share of mining in GDP may lead to a relatively unequal distribution of income due to rent seeking activities, and hence to slower growth (Rodriguez and Sachs 1999) . The incidence of malaria may limit economic development through poor health, high mortality, and absenteeism of the workforce. Accordingly, Bloom and Sachs (1998) have argued for the importance of malaria in explaining African poverty.
However, we find statistically insignificant regression coefficients both for MINING (column (3)) and for MALARIA (column (4)).
Our basic result also remains intact if we enter all additional variables together (column (5)). We still find that quality-adjusted human capital has a statistically significant positive effect on the income of the poor in We also consider the possibility that OLS-estimation of equation (4) might lead to upward biased coefficients because the stock of qualityadjusted human capital is an endogenous variable which depends, through the political process, on the level of the income of the poor. For instance, in countries where the income of the poor is relatively high, relatively more resources may be available for investment in education. In that case, the causality could run from the income of the poor to the stock of quality-adjusted human capital, and not the other way round as presumed in equation (4). A similar reasoning could also be applied with respect to average per capita income, as discussed in Dollar and Kraay (2001) .
However, they find that the possible endogeneity of average per capita income (ln y) does not cause an upward bias in the estimated regression coefficient.
Since we estimate basically the same regression coefficient on average per capita income of about 1 as do Dollar and Kraay (2001) , we impose their empirical result as restriction on equation (4) be useful instruments for human capital accumulation in so far as they proxy for the institutional framework of a country, as suggested by Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2000) . If so, these variables should be correlated with ln (H/L), but not with the error term of equation (5).
The results of our IV-estimation are presented in Table 2 . In all three specifications, the estimated effect of our human capital measure on the difference between the per capita income of the poor and the average per capita income is positive and statistically significant. When we use both instruments together, a chi-squared test on overidentifying restrictions does not reject the underlying hypothesis that both instruments are uncorrelated with the error term (critical value for 1 degree of freedom at the 5 percent level of statistical significance: 3.84).
On average, our three IV point estimates imply that a 10 percent change in our measure of human capital would generate a 3.7 percent increase in the average income of the poor relative to average income (which may also rise because of an increase of human capital). This distributional effect is larger than the effects estimated with OLS (see Table 1 ). A possible interpretation of the difference between IV-and OLS-results is that a potential positive effect of simultaneity on the estimated coefficient is outweighed by a potential negative effect of measurement error. Hence taken together, our findings suggest that in addition to its growth effect, improving the stock of human capital may have a substantial distributional effect on the average income of the poor.
IV. Outlook
From a political economy perspective as well as according to some endogenous growth models, a more equal distribution of income should be conducive to growth if it reduces social conflict and guarantees a greater protection of private property rights. If, for instance, imperfect capital markets are responsible for observed inequality, then a certain amount of redistribution is believed to enhance growth and welfare because it would transfer resources to agents with potentially higher returns to investment. Redistribution through state-funded access to primary and secondary education for all children might be an efficient why to implement such a transfer of resources.
Overall, our empirical results confirm that education is not distributionneutral. Education seems to improve the income distribution and thus may allow the poor to benefit from growth to a greater extent.
Accordingly, a focus of economic policies on education in order to reduce poverty and to speed up development appears to be justified. Our empirical findings indicate that improving the quality of education rather than merely expanding access to education should play a crucial role in development strategies.
Several issues for future research are immediately apparent from our analysis. First, the direction of causality between inequality and human capital accumulation somehow remains an open question.
Notwithstanding our results in Table 2 , more empirical research based on alternative instrumental variables is probably necessary to support the interpretation given in our paper. Second, while our findings provide an encouraging impetus for the use of education policies as part of anti-poverty programs, a rigorous theoretical framework supporting such a claim is still missing.
Third, and most importantly, highlighting the importance of education policy, as we do, should be accompanied by a more precise identification of effective education policies that would actually generate the expected effects. This is an important caveat because recent empirical evidence for OECD countries and for selected East Asian countries tends to suggest that additional schooling resources do not automatically guarantee improved schooling outcomes . The international empirical evidence presented in indeed reveals that schooling outcomes depend more on schooling institutions than on schooling resources. Hence creating efficient schooling systems is probably more important for improving the stock of human capital than increasing schooling expenditure. 
